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Rethinking Article 422:  
A Retrospective on Ecuador’s 2008 Constitutional ISDS Recalibration 





Is Ecuador’s adoption of Article 422 in the 2008 Constitution properly viewed as a 
“re-statification”1 of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)? And, since its 
implementation, has the constitutional article been effective in institutionally 
insulating Ecuador from the jurisdictional reach of international ISDS? This paper 
answers both questions in the negative—but qualifies such an outlook by balancing 
the drawbacks of Article 422 against its successes. Article 422’s provisions, 
strident in its attempt to create an alternative development vision, did not achieve 
all that the Constitution’s drafters had hoped. Nevertheless, in its limited effect of 
detaching Ecuador from certain ISDS fora, it did productively reorient the 
country’s engagement with external economic forces in a manner that is hopeful.  
 
  
                                                                 
* JD/MPA Candidate at Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law and School of Public and Environmental 
Affairs, and founding Editor-in-Chief of the Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design at Maurer’s Center for 
Constitutional Democracy. The author would like to extend a deep gratitude to Professor Susan H. Williams and 
David C. Williams for all their assistance and patience in offering advice on the (many) drafts of this piece.  
1 This term is first used in the title of an article co-authored by the respected international arbitrator, Honorable 
Charles N. Brower, and the research scholar, Sadie Blanchard. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From 
“Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting From Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute 





Article 422(1): Treaties or international instruments where the Ecuadorian State 
yields its sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration entities in disputes 
involving contracts or trade between the State and natural persons or legal entities 
cannot be entered into.2 
"[T]he Constitution itself can no longer pretend anymore to provide a 
comprehensive regulatory framework of the state on its own. . . [T]he national 
Constitution today and in the future is to be considered a ‘partial constitution,’ 
which is completed by the other levels of governance.”3 
“[International Investment Arbitration]  is rooted in international, extra-
jurisdictional substitutes for domestic institutional quality. These substitutes . . . 
have expanded even more rapidly than domestic investments in governance, and 




September 2008 heralded much change for Ecuador: its adoption of a new Constitution5 by popular 
referendum seemed to turn a new page for the nation. In particular, several of the Constitution’s 
provisions gave rise to the belief that Ecuador had successfully redesigned a novel approach to 
handling foreign investment6 and set forth a strategy to separate the country from any external 
influence over the resolution of disputes that arose from investment.7 Specifically, Article 422 
prohibited the country from entering into treaties that provided jurisdiction to outside arbitral 
tribunals for the resolution of disputes arising between the State and foreign investors.  
This paper will assess the goals and effects of Article 422. It will begin with a discussion of the 
constitutional mechanism and its textual construction, as well as the contextual anti-neolibe ra l, 
alternative development rationale behind its inclusion by the Constituent Assembly in Ecuador’s 
2008 Constitution. The paper will then contrast the initial enthusiasm of the government’s three 
branches in denouncing the International Investment Treaty framework and Investor State Dispute 
Settlement System with a longitudinal assessment of the greater part of the last decade—arguing 
                                                                 
2 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422(1).  
3 Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 
261, 303–04 (2003). To this effect, this piece is written for constitutional design practitioners, and aspires to lend 
perspective into the numerous ways that “[p]owers are increasingly shifted from the national level as embodied to 
international and supranational governance structures.” Id. at 302.   
4 Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance, 25 INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 107–23 (2005). 
5 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008.  
6 See Christina L. Madden, Laws Gone Wild in Ecuador: Indigenous People and Ecosystems Gain Rights , POL’Y 
INNOVATIONS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000077.  
7 See id. 
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that Article 422, instead of successfully disengaging from the country’s international investor-state 
obligations, remains minimally significant in light of the continuing bilateral trade agreements that 
still subject the country to the long-arm of international treaty arbitration. 
To make this case, the paper will explore four distinct aspects of Article 422, each of which detracts 
from Ecuador’s intent to “restatify” ISDS, or completely eliminate any jurisdictional reach of 
external ISDS bodies over Ecuador’s international investment agreements : 1) the constitutiona l 
article’s inability to remove Ecuador from ongoing, already-initiated arbitration proceedings; 2) 
the article’s silence regarding retroactive application of its prohibition on ceding sovereignty, or 
regarding a requirement on the government’s behalf to affirmatively remove existing treaties that 
directly contradict 422(1); 3) the article’s ambiguity concerning putative treaty claims that arise 
from Ecuador’s investment treaty obligations; and 4) the article’s allowance of arbitration clauses 
in trade agreements and investment contracts under the exception of 422(2) for “regiona l 
arbitration entities,” and the sustained courting of foreign direct investment in certain industr ies 
that results. Each of these lacunas in the text of Article 422, left unaccounted for by Constituent 
Assembly drafters, detracts from the government’s ability to resist neoliberal pressures.  
This paper concludes by briefly positing that the functional shortcomings of Article 422 are 
nonetheless offset by its symbolic success. Undoubtedly, the end effect of Article 422 is 
reorienting the country toward regional, instead of international, solutions—it does not signify an 
entire, thorough disengagement from the dominant ISDS paradigm. This should not overshadow 
the narrative faculty of Article 422 that is still left intact: the constitutional mechanism 
symbolically instantiates Ecuador’s political, socio-cultural sentiment of the environmenta l, 
indigenous concept of Sumak Kawsay (SK), in successful resistance to the prevailing internationa l 
investment framework.  
Put differently, the Correa government’s intent for Article 422 to operate as a domestic, 
constitutional bulwark against the jurisdiction of international investment arbitration tribunals was 
not realized. Nevertheless, its inability to inoculate the government entirely from the norms of 
bilateral investment treaties and, by extension, the international economic investment framework , 
should not entirely obscure the Article 422’s underlying role as a “pre-commitment device”8 to an 
alternative development vision antithetical to investment liberalization. Article 422, as such, 
functions as a constitutional gesture toward regional integration. It is a necessary component in a 
constitutional domestic re-configuration9  that paves the way for a South American “hybrid regime 
                                                                 
8 Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT : ON THE THEORY OF 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 129–41, 157–62 (2000). 
9 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law , 38 NYU J. INT ’L L 
& POL. 707, 719–21 (2006). 
 4 
 
for international investment arbitration,”10 premised principally on the regional consortium 
embodied by UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre.11  
 
I. The Legal Recalibration Mechanism of Article 422 
 
Criticism of investment treaty arbitration is not new;12 the onslaught of constitutional challenges 
brought to bear upon the current investor-state paradigm is, however, a rather recent 
phenomenon.13 Such challenges invoke constitutional vocabulary, including the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fairness.14  The constitutional text of Ecuador’s 
Article 422 embodies these challenges—although, as this paper will argue, it fails to affect the full 
extent of changes sought in its enactment. 
The sentiments of President Correa in urging the Constituent Assembly (“CA”) to draft Article 
422 are numerous and generally reflect the anti-neoliberal shift of the South American country 
over the previous two decades. But, as this article points out, the choices expressed in the 
constitutional mechanism of Article 42215—that make it the lynchpin of repositioning the country 
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the modern international investor-state protection 
infrastructure—were insufficient to properly insulate Ecuador from the pressures that force it to 
engage, to this day, with the very arbitral tribunal entities from which the country sought to 
separate. The President and the CA might have genuinely desired that Article 422 would enable 
Ecuador to resist the jurisdiction of distant, foreign, and unfriendly (read favorable-to-investors) 
investor-state arbitral tribunals, such as International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) or any other of the similarly analogous “investment-protection” bodies.16 But this has 
                                                                 
10 See Kendall Grant, The ICSID Under Siege: UNASUR And The Rise Of A Hybrid Regime For International 
Investment Arbitration (Osgoode Legal Studs.,  Res. Paper No. 26, 2015), available at  
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=olsrps.  
11 See South America Forms Alternative to Free Trade Kangaroo Courts, TELESUR (Jan. 19, 2016),    
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/UNASUR-Close-to-Forming-Investor-Dispute-Center-20160119-0036.html; 
see also UNASUR Arbitration Centre One Step Closer to Being Established , INV. TREATY NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/unasur-arbitration-centre-one-step-closer-to-being-established. See generally 
Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, UNASUR Arbitration Centre: The Present Situation and the Principal Characteristics of 
Ecuador’s Proposal, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/01/12/unasur/. 
12  See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36 
(1944); Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 NYU L. REV. 661 (1963). 
13 See Stephan W. Schill, Conceptions of Legitimacy of International Arbitration , in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 106, 113 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015).   
14 Id. at 112. 
15 These choices might reflect, perhaps, the Assembly’s own sentiments, separate from President Correa’s or the 
general will of the people, in drafting the specific text of the article. Or, in a slightly different vein, the textual 
choices expressed in Article 422 might actually represent the des ires of the CA—yet, as practice often differs from 
theory, the specific choices in the text reflect the Assembly’s lack of expertise in the technical matters of 
international investment law. This latter interpretation, one which highlights the importance in careful, technical 
constitutional drafting, is more consistent with the spirit of this paper.  
16 See Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World , 8 SAN 
DIEGO INT 'L L.J. 345, 373–75 (2007) (arguing that the legitimacy of the ICSID body is critiqued on the grounds that 
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not been the result: the current situation in Ecuador supports a narrative divergent from the 
motivating spirit17 and actual text of Article 422.  
The new Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes arbitration, as had its predecessor, as a generally 
valid alternative dispute mechanism.18 Nevertheless, Article 422 singled out internationa l 
arbitration (the context in which investor-states disputes arise) as a mechanism in the panoply of 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and prohibited certain usages prospectively. As the text of 
Article 422(1) reads, treaties19 that “yield [Ecuador’s] sovereign jurisdiction”20 to internationa l 
arbitration bodies21 in disputes involving investment22 cannot be entered into.  
For President Correa, who entered the executive post two years prior, the Constitution symbolized 
an opportunity to recreate the country, to re-establish Amazonian Ecuador upon new 
environmental and socio-political principles, and to rebuke the decaying neoliberal economics that 
had crippled the nation since the late 1980s.23 The first twenty-four months in office were full of 
far-reaching initiatives and executive actions designed to achieve Correa’s platform, described as 
the “citizen’s revolution.”24 But the crucial step to the realization of his goals lay in one of his first 
acts as President25 when, in his second decree, Correa called for a popular referendum to take place 
and decide whether to convene a national body that would have full powers over crafting a new 
constitutional text.26 On April 15, 2007, the country voted in favor of forming the Constituent 
Assembly and, a few months later, a representative body charged with crafting a constitution to be 
placed for popular vote, was elected.27 Twenty-four national assembly members, 100 provincia l 
                                                                 
it adopts a “single economic rationale for investment protection,” devoid of alternative democratic interests of the 
host-state and its citizenry).  
17 See generally Jonas Gamso, A Case of Diversified Dependency: Macrostructural Change and Policy Alternatives 
in Ecuador, 43 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 109 (2016).   
18 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 190. 
19 For example, the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, INT ’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/ICSID-Convention.aspx (last visited May 1, 2016). 
20 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422.   
21 For example, the ICSID arbitral tribunal. See CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES arts. 37–47, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.  
22 More precisely, the text of Article 422 prevents “contracts or trade between the State and natural persons or legal 
entities.” CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422.   
23 Jennifer N. Collins, Rafael Correa and the Struggle for a New Ecuador, 10 GLOBAL DIALOGUE (2008), available 
at http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=426 (“For President Correa and his PAIS Alliance (Country 
Alliance) party, the constitution represents a chance to refound Ecuador on new economic, political, and even social 
principles, and to exorcise from its body politic the living ghosts of neo-liberalism, political corruption, elite 
dominance, and social and economic exclusion.”). 
24 See, e.g., Ecuador's Citizens' Revolution: Putting People Before Profit , TELESUR (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/telesuragenda/Ecuadors-Citizens-Revolution-Putting-People-Before-Profit-
20150108-0025.html (media coverage of Correa’s platform). 
25 See CARTER CTR., FINAL REPORT ON ECUADOR’S APPROBATORY CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OF SEPTEMBER 
28, 2008 4 (Oct. 25, 2008), https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/15116/uploads. 
26 See id.  
27 See Collins, supra note 23. For more on the Constituent Assembly,  see generally CARTER CTR., REPORT ON THE 





assembly members, and six representatives of migrants living outside the country were selected to 
serve in the CA, with the President’s political movement, the Patria Altiva y Soberana (PAIS) 
coalition, winning 80 of the 130 elected seats.28 
Article 422 originated within the crucial working committee of the CA entitled “Sovereignty, 
International Relations, and Latin American Integration,”29 which drafted rules to place 
appropriate strictures upon the government’s capacity to cede sovereignty. With their progress 
observed closely by the media,30  the working committee sought to craft constitutional constraints 
on the executive’s ability to sign treaties in several contexts. The rules placed 
 
brakes on the executive’s ability to enter into treaties . . . strongly opposed by the 
public, such as . . . any future attempt to sign a free-trade agreement with the United 
States, something that previous governments pursued even in the face of strong 
opposition from the indigenous movement, small farmers, and environmentalists. 31 
 
The Committee was comprised of PAIS members who deeply resented previous governments’ 
systematic disregard for the interests of the Ecuadorean citizenry in favor of neoliberal investment 
interests.32 Their position toward international investor-state arbitration was to prohibit it 
altogether.33 The government, in this way, nodded to the principles of the Calvo Doctrine, which 
considered suits between private parties and governments litigated in international fora as 
representing an impermissible infringement on the state’s national sovereignty.34 The working 
committee, then, wished to forge, within the smithy of the 2008 Constitution, the means to “ensure 
the observance of constitutional principles in economic policy.”35 And, accordingly, the finalized 
text of Article 422 was held the appropriate mechanism to do so.36  
                                                                 
28 See CARTER CTR., supra note 25, at 4.   
29 See KATIA FACH GOMEZ, ECUADOR’S ATTAINMENT OF SUMAK KAWSAY AND THE ROLE ASSIGNED TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Aug. 4, 2011) (draft at 4), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904715. Also, the success of the working group is surprising: 
halfway into the Assembly’s six-month tenure, the only committee to have managed to approve constitutional 
articles for consideration by the plenary was the Committee on Sovereignty, International Relations and Latin 
American Integration.  See Ecuador: The Constituent Assembly's Three Month Benchmark, WikiLeaks (Mar. 6, 
2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08QUITO223_a.html.  
30 The working group was observed in the international media, s ee, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Arbitration 
Trends in Latin America, 239 N.Y. L.J. No. 108 (Jun. 5, 2008), as well as its domestic counterpart, see, e.g., Solo los 
arbitrajes de la región serán admitidos por la Constitución , Editorial, EL COMERCIO, May 21, 2008 (translated as 
“Only Arbitrations in The Region Will Be Supported by the Constitution”). 
31 Collins, supra note 23. 
32 See id.  
33 See Eric Gillman, The End of Investor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis of Article 422 of the 
Constitution of 2008, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 269, 291 (2008). 
34 See id. 
35 Claudia Müller-Hoff, How Does the New Constitutionalism Respond to the Human Rights Challenges Posed by 
Transnational Corporations?, in NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISES AND PRACTICES 333, 333 
(Detlef Nolte & Almut Schilling-Vacaflor eds., 2012).  
36 See GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 5, n.13. 
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Note that within the Ecuadorian context those constitutional principles mentioned above include 
norms consistent in large part with the achievement of “Sumak Kawsay” (“SK”), or the Quechuan 
concept of “Buen Vivir,” or “Good Living.”37 SK is understood as a “system of . . . living based 
on the communion of humans and nature and on the spatial-temporal harmonious totality of 
existence.”38 As one commentator notes:  
 
In all, Sumak Kawsay, or its Spanish translation, is mentioned 25 times in 
Ecuador’s Constitution.  Most importantly, it is mentioned in the Constitution’s 
prologue in the context of the country wanting to create “a new form of citizen 
coexistence, in diversity and harmony with nature, to achieve “living well”, Sumak 
Kawsay”. The concept has its own chapter with 25 articles describing to 
Ecuadorians their basic rights associated with it, but no clear definition is given. 
The rights include the right to live in a healthy environment, rights to education, 
access to water, freedom of association, and access to health.39 
 
Per this perspective, Article 422 functions as the constitutional mechanism aimed at unhinging the 
country from the dominant ISDS paradigm—that, in turn, serves as one step in a larger, 
multifaceted approach in achieving the “people’s right” to SK.40  
 
II. The Initial Impacts of Article 422 
 
This paper turns next to the initial enthusiasm surrounding the passage of Article 422. Each of 
Ecuador’s three government branches employed the article in different ways. The summation of 
their combined efforts, all aimed toward the goal of detaching the country from the Internationa l 
Investment Treaty framework and dominant ISDS paradigm, remained insufficient. A comparative 
bookend sketch of the government’s initial responses illustrates this point.  
Article 422 (within the domestic framework of the country’s government, i.e. Ecuador’s 
governance vis-à-vis foreign investment) initiated a reflexive hardening of the government against 
Investor-State Arbitration. The executive branch led the charge. After an approved plenary request 
to the Legislative and Audit Commission41 and a nearly unanimous vote in the National 
                                                                 
37 Carlos Zorrilla, The Struggle over Sumak Kawsay in Ecuador, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/4810-the-struggle-over-sumak-kawsay-in-ecuador. See 
generally DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 146–50, 156–58 (2013). 
38 Zorrilla, supra note 37. 
39 Id.  
40 This right to SK, as such, is a life “not based necessarily on an economic-materialistic vision of life and living . . . 
but rather one based on cultural understandings of what that living well means.”  Id. 
41 See Registro Oficial No. 632 – Lunes 13 de Julio de 2009 (R.O. 632, July 13, 2009) (Ecuador) [hereinafter 
Registro Oficial], available at http://www.derechoecuador.com/productos/producto/catalogo/registros-
oficiales/2009/julio/code/19315/registro-oficial-no-632---lunes-13-de-ju lio -de-2009 (“[T]hat the plenary of the 
Legislative and Oversight Commission, at the 44th meeting of June 12, 2009, resolved to approve the complaint 
[against ICSID].” (translation by author)). 
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Assembly,42 President Correa signed Executive Decree 1823, planning to end the country’s foreign 
commitment as signatories to the ICSID Convention.43 Following the Decree’s declaration of “the 
termination of the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes,” notice of the denunciat ion 
was served upon ICSID on July 6, 2009. After the required six-month exit period,44 Ecuador ceased 
to be a party to the international convention.45 This exit un-recognized the jurisdiction of ICSID 
to resolve international investment claims involving Ecuador.46   
On September 28, 2009, by way of Official Letter No. 4766-T-09-2216 GMS, Correa also 
requested that the National Assembly denounce various BITs on grounds that they contained 
provisions contrary to Article 422.47 The National Assembly returned this request on procedural 
grounds—Correa’s request required the country’s Constitutional Court to determine the treaties as 
unconstitutional. Starting in June 2010, the Court began to issue a series of judgments declaring 
the unconstitutionality of articles within the BITs with the United Kingdom, Germany, China, 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France.48 For the majority of the BITs submitted to the 
Court, the provisions in contest were the BIT’s dispute resolution clauses that, when constructed 
to submit putative disputes to ICSID or other ISDS-dominant arbitration schemes, directly 
conflicted with Article 422 of the 2008 Constitution.49 Since then, the Court has also added to the 
list similar provisions under BITs entered into agreement with, inter alia, Venezuela, Chile, 
Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Spain, and Italy.50 Note, though, 
                                                                 
42 See Ecuador renunció ayer al Ciadi por decisión de la Comisión Legislativa , EL UNIVERSO, June 13, 2009, 
http://www.eluniverso.com/2009/06/13/1/1355/0A1B8191EE3E40D5A2337486894A24F7.html (“50 votes in favor, 
4 votes against and five abstaining votes .” (translation by author)).  
43 See Registro Oficial, supra note 41.  
44 See Timothy G. Nelson & Marco E. Schnabl, Ecuador Moves to Denounce and Leave the ICSID Convention, 
Attempts to Curtail Investor-State Arbitration Rights, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., June 30, 2009, at 18, available at 
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications1854_0.pdf. 
45 See Eduardo Carmigniani et al., Arbitration 2016, LATIN LAWYER (Apr. 13, 2016),   
http://latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/45/jurisdictions/32/ecuador; see also Nelson & Schnabl, supra note 44, at 
18–19.  
46 See Nelson & Schnabl, supra note 44, at 18. Regardless, as discussed in the next section, such a denunciation 
failed to remove Ecuador from on-going arbitral proceedings by ICSID tribunals. 
47 See AC GARCÉS DEL POZO, EL ALCANCE DE LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 422 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN COMO 
MECANISMO PARA BLINDAR AL ESTADO DEL ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL 67 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished LL.B. thesis, 
Universidad San Francisco De Quito), available at http://repositorio.usfq.edu.ec/bitstream/23000/1214/1/101030.pdf  
(“President Rafael Correa made a request to the National Assembly for denouncing the Bilateral Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments that Ecuador signed with Finland, Sweden, Canada, China, Netherlands, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Switzerland and the United States.” 
(translation by author)).  
48 See GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 18, n.49; see also U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2008: 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE 65 nn.107, 108 (2008); KARSTEN 
NOWROT , INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR: FROM ARBITRAL BILATERALISM TO 
JUDICIAL REGIONALISM 6 (MLU Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht 2010), available at http://telc.jura.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft_96.pdf.  
49 See id. 
50 See Álvaro Galindo & Francisco Endara, Ecuador, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARDS IN LATIN AMERICA: LAW, PRACTICE AND LEADING CASES 121, 123 n.12 (Omar E. 
García-Bolívar & Hernando Otero eds., 2014). For the most recent account of the Constitutionality of Ecuador’s 
BITs as compiled within the recently leaked document of the Commission for Citizen In tegral Audit of the Treaty of 
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that the government and Court’s usage of Article 422 as a launching point for the declaration of 
unconstitutionality regarding their international agreements did not realize in a full repudiation of 
their obligations, several of which remain on the books and in force,51 as the next section will touch 
upon. 
The fervor behind Article 422 continues to the present. In May 2013, Correa created, by executive 
decree,52 a joint government-civil society commission to audit Ecuador’s bilateral investment 
treaties and the country’s obligations under the international arbitration system.53 The 
Commission, referred to as CAITISA,54 was comprised of a mixture of investment lawyers, civil 
society representatives, and government officials. Following its launch in October 2013, CAITISA 
set to its task of determining the “legality, legitimacy and lawfulness of investment treaties, rules 
and Ecuador’s commitments, and the possible inconsistencies and irregularities in the decisions of 
arbitration tribunals that . . . caused negative impacts to the Ecuadorean state.”55  It is important to 
note, though, that the majority (eight of twelve individuals) of the Commission’s composition 
came from outside the domestic government56 and—surprisingly, perhaps—a higher percentage 
were non-Ecuadorians than natives.57  
At first glance, the fact that the Ecuadorian government needed to establish a Commission to 
review BITs and the ISDS framework in early 2013 is not readily explainable from a legal 
(domestic) or institutional standpoint. For, beginning in 2008, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court 
started reviewing the ISDS framework under the power granted to it by the country’s constitut ion. 
The Court already served as an apex judicial entity equipped with sufficient review powers to deal 
away with the country’s entire BIT lattice.58  In only two years’ time, the same Constitutiona l 
                                                                 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments and the System of International Arbitration Responsible Investment, see 
COMISIÓN PARA LA AUDITORÍA INTEGRAL CIUDADANA DE LOS TRATADOS DE PROTECCIÓN RECÍPROCA DE 
INVERSIONES Y DEL SISTEMA DE ARBITRAJE EN MATERIA DE INVERSIONES, CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES (Dec. 2015), 
available at https://issuu.com/periodicodiagonal/docs/conclusiones_caitisa [hereinafter CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES].  
51 Compare BURGHARD ILGE, TO CHANGE A BIT IS NOT ENOUGH: ON THE NEED TO CREATE SOUND POLICY 
FRAMEWORKS FOR INVESTMENT  18 (2015), http://www.s2bnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/To_Change_a_BIT_is_not_enough_sept_2015_HR.pdf, with ECUADOR BITS, UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/61 (last visited May 15, 2016).   
52 Créase La Comisión Para La Auditoría Integral Ciudadana De Los Tratados De Protección Recíproca De 
Inversiones Y Del Sistema De Arbitraje Internacional En Materia De Inversiones Caitisa (R.O. 958, May 21, 2013) 
(Ecuador), available at http://decretos.cege.gob.ec/decretos/decretos.aspx?id=2009 (“Decree 1506”; search by 
selecting “Período 2009-2013,” entering “1506” for “Número de Decreto” and hitting search field). 
53 See U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., TOWARDS A REPOSITORY OF POLICY OPTIONS FOR IIA REFORM (2015), 
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CAITISA.pdf. 
54 The acronym results from the organization’s Spanish name. See Andres G. Arauz, Ecuador’s Experience with 
International Investment Arbitration , SO. CTR. INV. POL’Y BRIEF, Aug. 2015, at 1, available at 
http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPB5_Ecuador%E2%80%99s -Experience-with-Intl-
Investment-Arbitration_EN.pdf. 
55 See Arauz, supra note 54. 
56 See U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., supra note 53. 
57 See id. 
58 Under the 2008 Constitution, constitutional judgments contain mandatory binding precedent upon all Ecuadorian 
legislation, see 3RD CONGRESS WORLD CONF. ON CONST . JUSTICE, QUESTIONNAIRE – REPLY BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ECUADOR 4 (Oct. 1, 2014),  
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Court, a court with “the power to declare the unconstitutionality of laws through constitutiona l 
challenges, consultations of norms, and automatic constitutionality control,”59 had already wielded 
Article 422 in its judicial review of Ecuador’s BIT and declared certain provisions of several BITs 
unconstitutional.60 A separate institution housed in the executive, separate from the judicial branch, 
would seem superfluous by 2013—had the government followed through on the Constitutiona l 
Court decrees and terminated the then-unconstitutional framework of BITs.  
Nevertheless, the executive administration created CAITISA, which set about diligently 
“reviewing” the country’s BITs and determining the effects ISDS had on Ecuador. This paper 
posits that the establishment of CAITISA parallels a theme running throughout this paper: 
Ecuador’s “re-”reviewing of its BIT commitments was a doubling down by the government—and 
perhaps a necessary one—to stir up the necessary political resolve to resist foreign investment 
tribunals and the trappings of the international dispute settlement system.  
For, as far as public international law goes, Ecuador remains a party to several BITs to this date—
treaties and treaty clauses that remain in force despite their unconstitutional nature at home.61 This 
fact comes as a surprise, given Ecuador’s decision in 2008 to inform nine countries—Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and 
Uruguay—of its denunciation of the BITs concluded with them;62 and given that it followed suit 
in 2010 by concluding its agreement with Finland to follow the Constitutional Court’s declaration 
of its unconstitutionality.63 Nevertheless, perhaps against expectation, Ecuador did not likewise 
follow other, similar proclamations of the Court, and forewent unilaterally terminating each and 
every BIT relationship declared unconstitutional by the Court,64 leaving several such BITs in force. 
Those agreements, which are to the present day still in force, continue to subject Ecuador to the 
                                                                 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Seoul/docs/Ecuador_CC_reply_questionnaire_3WCCJ-E.pdf, which seems to 
suggest that the unconstitutional declaration by the Court of the bilateral investment treaties precludes any need to 
create a separate entity to review the BITs.   
59 Id. at 1. Note that the Constitutional Court established by the 2008 Constitution is unlike the previous document’s 
Constitutional Tribunal, which merely “issued resolutions (that did not constitute precedent) and did not have judges 
but tribal members.” See id. at 3. 
60 See Galindo & Endara, supra note 50, at 123. 
61 See ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51 (listing all BITS that are still in force globally); see also NOWROT , supra note 
48, at 25. 
62 See Karsten Nowrot, Termination and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, in SHIFTING 
PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED 
227, 233 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016) [hereinafter SHIFTING PARADIGMS].  
63 See id. 
64 Note that the avenues, as a matter of international investment law, available to Ecuador—regarding BITs of which 
it no longer wished to be a part—are few. Upon a finding of incompatibility between the ISDS arbitration clause and 
Article 422 by the Constitutional Court, the administration would presumably either need to renegotiate the BIT 
relationship with the appropriate state, or unilaterally terminate it. Both are costly ventures, as seen in Ecuador’s 
experience, described below. For a brief description of the options available to a nation who wishes to amend an 
investment treaty, and accompanying theoretical framework explaining those options, see generally Yoram Z. Haftel 
& Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate International Treaties? The Case of Bilateral Investment 




dominant international dispute settlement paradigm—notwithstanding official declarations by the 
country’s highest Court of their unconstitutionality and conflict with Article 422.65  
An exploration into the possible constitutional reasoning why such treaties remain in force follows 
in the next section—and is supported primarily by a textual analysis of Article 422 itself. Before 
turning to the analytic exercise of interpreting constitutional drafting, however, this paper makes 
a minor aside. It seeks to soften, in some ways, the stark, largely defiant lattice of investment 
treaties that Ecuador maintains on the books despite their constitutionally outstanding nature, by 
briefly outlining the touch political environs of present-day Ecuador. 
Tough political and diplomatic choices face the President and National Assembly of a developing 
South American oil-rich, but economically diversity-poor, country. Both non-judicial branches 
walk a dangerous tightrope. Ecuador’s internal economy—heavily dependent on investments in 
its extractive industry66—bestows vast significance upon investment treaties.67 Faced with the 
decision to either unilaterally terminate or renegotiate the majority of investment treaties currently 
on the books,68 the government may seek to avoid making that choice at all costs. Unilatera l 
termination of vital investment treaties would prove disastrous to an already-volatile economy—
while renegotiation, the other option typically available to states seeking to amend their investment 
treaties, is similarly difficult.69 This problem compounds further given the specific importance that 
investors place on the protections and procedural rights of BIT clauses making available 
international investment treaty arbitration.70 At least in this narrow case,71 not following the orders 
of the Constitutional Court to remove unconstitutional BIT clauses might prove politically less 
                                                                 
65 Compare Galindo & Endara, supra note 50, with ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51. Comparing the lists and focusing 
upon the lengthy list on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub page of still “in force” agreements, reveals that 
several of the Court decisions have not been heeded; namely, United Kingdom, China, Sweden, the Netherlan ds, 
France, Venezuela, Chile, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Spain, and Italy all 
remain on the books, despite the proclamation of the Court of the relevant parts of each agreement as 
unconstitutional.  
66 See Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights Under Ecuador’s Constitution: Why 
the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite , 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 659, 662–63; see also 
SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 37, at 152–56 (describing how Correa saddled up in 2011 to sign the country’s “first 
large-scale mining project with Chinese-owned Ecuaorriente, agreed to the construction of a hydropower project 
with China’s Harbin Electric International, and isnged contracts with US-based Schlumberger and Argentina’s 
Tecpetrol worth US $1.7 billion to develop mature oil reserves” (internal citations omitted)).  
67 See Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, Ecuador's Rafael Correa Pushes for Foreign Investment , CNBC (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/15/ecuadors -rafael-correa-pushes-for-foreign-investment.html. 
68 See ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51. 
69 See note 63. 
70 See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law , 19 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 340 (2007) (suggesting that the availability of investment treaty 
arbitration may not directly trigger foreign direct investment but it serves as one factor in an investors decisional 
matrix). 
71 And, with recourse to no other consequences besides those contemplated in the above paragraph.  
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difficult for the Executive than alternatively following through on the former’s constitutiona l 
decree.72  
Ecuador’s government, thus, approaches the role of investment treaties in its national economy 
with pragmatism. It makes the correct political movement (with alacrity), calling for constitutiona l 
provisions to be placed inside the 2008 constitution, forcing itself to refrain from “ceding 
sovereignty.” In this sense, the government declares itself bound, or “pre-committed,” to retaining 
its own sovereignty: all it needs in future investment treaty negotiations is to reference its national 
constitution—which might provide a bargaining chip on the table.  
This decision is easier for the executive to make than actually scrubbing the country clean of its 
international obligations. Such a move would expend endless amounts of international good will 
and will achieve draining the well of foreign investment—the latter an obvious economic disaster. 
Alternatively, the call for a revision of the constitution, complete with an anti-investment dispute 
settlement article, demonstrates commitment without having to expend effort internationally.  
The whole process73 of submitting existing BITs to the Constitutional Court for judicial review is 
similarly pragmatic. As the Court proclaims certain clauses of agreements unconstitutional, the 
government can curry favor domestically with its general voting constituencies while neglecting 
to accompany its domestic action with any corresponding alteration in the international framework 
of investment treaty—so long as it hints that it is seeking to “renegotiate” the treaties as such. 
These renegotiations are elusive, however.74  As the example of negotiations between Ecuador and 
the United States demonstrates,75 the government can ably drag its feet when it comes to following 
through with constructing viable alternatives—to the point that the government’s inaction de facto 
                                                                 
72 This is to suggest that the gambit that the President/executive branch (and to a lesser extent, the legislature) 
runs—by following through and terminating/amending the investment treaties —is greater than the gambit it runs 
when it decides to disregard the declaration of unconstitutionality. The first ends assuredly in a damaged domestic 
economy, and ensures the public voting them out of office. In this regard, the executive might have calculated that it 
would face less by answering to the apex judicial institution, the Constitutional Court, if ever it were to seek to 
enforce its decisions. This last observation hints at a sad reality of the Ecuadorian judiciary worth mentioning. The 
country’s Constitutional Court, only years into its existence (i.e. the 2008 constitution created the institution), has 
already obtained a less-than-stellar track record, and has been see as unreliable for the adjudging of constitutional 
grievances. See Whittemore, supra note 67, at 671–75 (noting infrastructural problems within the Court that has 
made it “vulnerable and unstable,” and which have “eroded judicial independence” in the institution).  
73 Or, cynically, the whole “theatrics” of Ecuador’s judicial review. 
74 This point lends itself heavily from the observations made by Van Harten. “[O]bviously someone negotiated the 
[investment] treaties with a degree of appreciation of their consequence and recommended their approval by 
ministers or by the governing party in the legislature.” GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
PUBLIC LAW 178 (2007). In a similar way, someone is (re)negotiating the treaties, with an appreciable understanding 
of the consequences of not reaching a final amending to the BIT, with a possible eye on maint aining the status quo.  
75 In the U.S. State Department’s 2015 Investment Climate Report—the latest Report available at the time of 
writing—the putative “renegotiation” of the United States -Ecuador BIT was declared non-existent. See U.S. DEP’T 
ST ., ECUADOR INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015 (June 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241754.pdf. Also note that declaration of “non-existence” comes from 
the perspective of the United States, the nation/negotiating entity to which the Ecuadorian gove rnment has been 
mandated to renegotiate (i.e. by the Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality). 
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maintains the status quo.76 That these negotiations are rarely made public, the government can 
declare its public intention without needing to enact any change. 
 
III. The Inability of Article 422 to “Re-Statify” ISDS 
 
This paper now turns to the text of Article 422. As written, the article is unable to “re-statify” 
international ISDS for Ecuador. It does not remove Ecuador from ongoing proceedings, does not 
affirmatively remove active bilateral investment treaties, and ambiguously deals with putative 
treaty claims arising from the country’s investment treaty obligations. And, most importantly, 
Article 422 leaves open the backdoor to regional arbitration under an exception found in 422(2). 
In each of these ways, Ecuador’s constitutional mechanism’s own language prevents the country 
from “re-statifying” international ISDS. Accordingly, Article 422 serves only as a partial rejection 
of investor-state arbitration: it fails to completely unyoke the country from the jurisdiction of 
outside investment arbitration bodies.  
 
The next section builds out this claim by exploring four distinct textual aspects of the article77  left 
unaccounted for by the CA drafters, each of which detracts from its motivating goal of resisting 
the dominant ISDS paradigm.  
 
A. Article 422’s inability to remove Ecuador from ongoing, already-initiated arbitration 
proceedings 
 
The easiest example of the above claim rests in existence of numerous outstanding ICSID claims 
brought against Ecuador. At the time of writing, fourteen cases against either the Republic itself 
or its national public sector entities are still meandering through the ICSID’s arbitration process, 
often taking circuitous routes to completion.78 These cases, though admittedly outside the 
crosshairs of Article 422, keep alive the specter of neoliberalism. As the arbitration proceedings 
progress, each step invites Ecuador’s government and citizens to unwelcome reminders of the 
country’s unsuccessful decoupling from the dominant ISDS paradigm. Cases initiated prior to 
2008, marking the passage of Article 422, cannot be touched nor constitutionally resisted on 
grounds of the constitutional mechanism.79  
                                                                 
76 See id. (announcing, from the U.S. State Department to United States investors , the safe nature of investment in 
the Ecuadorian economy).  
77 Note that this piece is not the first to have attempted detailed analyses of the entire article’s text, which is deeply 
telling. Constructions of the text, along with legal interpretations and cultural implications have been considered 
thoroughly elsewhere as well. See, e.g., GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 6–14.  
78 See ICSID Pending Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx (check “Ecuadorian” in 
“Respondent(s) Nationality(ies)” field; click search) (last visited May 15, 2016).   
79 This mostly self-apparent observation is buttressed by the norm of investment tribunal jurisdiction that states that 
consent (actual included) to the settlement of a dispute is the touchstone to jurisdiction. See Sadie Blanchard, State 
Consent, Temporal Jurisdiction, and the Importation of Continuing Circumstances Analysis into International 
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B. Article 422’s silence regarding retroactive application of its prohibition on ceding 
sovereignty or of any requirement to affirmatively remove existing bilateral investment 
treaties that directly contradict 422(1) 
 
In its strongest sense, the text of article 422(1) serves only as an affirmative prohibit ion 
prospectively. Plainly, it declines the option for the government to offer to cede “sovereign 
jurisdiction” in future investment treaties. As such, the article operates as an active restriction on 
Ecuador only from entering into such treaties that would then, at that point, obligate the state to 
relinquish sovereign jurisdiction.  
Tellingly, the article does not make clear its intentions for treaties that are not prospective, but, 
instead, are in force at the moment when the article passes into existence.80 And, nowhere does its 
prohibition extend to treaties or international instruments that have already been entered into or 
given force prior to the passage of Article 422. In effect, this means that the article does not 
contemplate international investment treaties that entered into force before it, itself, had 
For, as written, Article 422 is not self-executing. It lacks any interpretive, non-preambulatory text 
demanding real action from any governmental institution—beyond that they refrain from future 
action. It does not charge any single branch with animating Article 422; thus, no single branch will 
expend political will to give it bite.81  
President Correa’s request to the National Assembly to invalidate the BITs on the books82 was 
returned for similar reason. When the Executive branch presented the request, the legisla ture 
stalled. The momentum behind the President’s request (i.e. an expenditure of political capital) was 
ultimately thwarted. The legislature hid behind their own lack of mandate, and hung Article 422 
on the hook of its own ambiguous, unclear text. Instead of acting on the request by the Correa, 
they instead looked to the judiciary and ably refrained from acting. They claimed the insuffic ient 
procedural go-ahead from the judiciary, and left the existing treaties in play.  
                                                                 
Investment Arbitration, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 419, 423 (2011); see also CONVENTION ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES art. 25, Mar. 18, 
1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.  
80 As pointed out previously, the text leaves, then, an ambiguity concerning periods of time prior to its own passage 
(pre-2008).  
81 Without such a mandate, the Constitution requires implementing legislation to retroactively apply it. At present, 
Ecuador lacks any such legislation. Cf. Omphemetse S. Sibanda, The Promotion and Protection of Foreign 
Investment Law Bill: Denunciation of BITs, and the De-Internationalisation of Investor-State Arbitration in South 
Africa, 4 BUS. & MANAGE. REV. 159, 160 (2014). Ecuador, in this manner, stands in marked contrast with South 
Africa, where  
on 4 November 2013 South Africa published for public comment the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill (Bill). Part of the process for a legislative approach toward FDI protection is the 
termination of BITs, and the restriction, implied though, on the availability of international 
arbitration of state-investor disputes. The Bill stood in draft form and was open to public comment  
until 1 February 2014. Id.  
82 See body text accompanying supra notes 47–51, 60–64. 
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The majority of the country’s major investment agreements are still able to remain in force  for 
similar reasons—despite the Constitutional Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality.83 For 
Ecuador, not actively removing BITs amounts to residual jurisdictional exposure from the 
investment treaties that remain in force to the present day. At present, the country still faces 
exposure to the dominant ISDS paradigm.  
The exposure is also exacerbated because of the gray zone between Ecuador’s denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention on one hand and the state’s BIT’s provision for ICSID arbitration on the other.84 
Executive Decree 1823 (i.e. Ecuador’s unilateral denunciations, as a host state, of the ICSID 
Convention) did not invalidate the grounds on which investment contract and commercial claims 
can be brought to ICSID. Many BIT agreements have recourse to ICSID arbitration as clauses 
nestled within the dispute resolution provisions of the BIT agreement. Investors might still pursue 
claims under them, relying on the treaty language of the existing BITs, thus bringing Ecuador 
before a tribunal of the dominant ISDS paradigm.  
More importantly, in this sense Article 422 makes claims for future, putative commercial and 
contractual rights under them still actionable. Ultimately, foreign investors can continue taking 
Ecuador to ICSID arbitration for investments that occurred after 2008.85 Any surviving Ecuador 
BITs to the present opens the door to the dominant ISDS paradigm for investors’ future contracts 
and commercial dispute claims that would have been foreclosed otherwise. Phrased differently: 
treaties currently in force provide an avenue for relief that is above and beyond the investor’s 
default recourse, had that same treaty not been in force with only a contractual agreement binding 
Ecuador to the investment.86  
The current investment trade relationship of Ecuador—taken from the perspective of those states 
which still have existing BITs with Ecuador on the books—serves as an important datum. Consider 
the country’s relationship with the United States, one of its largest trading partners. In its 
Investment Climate Statements for the period spanning 2010–14,87 the United States State 
                                                                 
83 See CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES, supra note 50.  
84 Which is to say: Ecuador’s denunciation of the ICSID occurred under Article 71 under the Convention.  Article 72 
of the Convention, which animates and helps interpret Article 71, is ambiguous when it outlines the effects of 
denunciations. This ambiguity makes relevant the text of surviving BITs —especially for Ecuador, with its handful. 
See CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., ONCE AND FOREVER? THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF A DENUNCIATION OF ICSID 6 (Martin 
Luther Halle-Wittenberg School of Law, Inst. Of Econ. L. Res. Paper 74, March 2008), 
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft74.pdf. But see CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN 
ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 236–41 (2008).   
85 See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador Prepares for Life After ICSID, While Debate Continues over Effect of Its 
Exit From the Centre, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08/28/ecuador-prepares-
for-life-after-icsid-while-debate-continues-over-effect-of-its-exit -from-the-centre/; see also CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET 
AL., supra note 92. 
86 See JAN OLE MOSS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST STATES AND FOREIGN 
INVESTORS 81–138 (2011). 
87 Compare 2010 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T ST . (2010), 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138060.htm, with 2011 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S. 
DEP’T ST . (2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157270.htm, 2012 Investment Climate Statement – 
Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T ST . (2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191141.htm, 2013 Investment Climate 
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Department maintains the following to its investors with regards to the BIT relationship between 
the United States and Ecuador:  
The existing U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) provides for binding 
international arbitration of disputes between the government and investor in a venue 
of the investor's choosing, including the ICSID Convention. Given Ecuador’s 2009 
withdrawal from the ICSID Convention, alternative arbitration venues available to 
U.S. investors include: ICSID’s Additional Facility; ad hoc arbitration under 
UNCITRAL rules; and arbitration administered by any other arbitral institution to 
which the parties agree. Should the Ecuadorian government terminate the U.S.-
Ecuador BIT, the BIT’s provisions would be fully in effect for one year from the 
date of termination notice, and for an additional 10 years for investments existing 
on the one year anniversary of the termination notice.88 
Though ICSID’s Additional Facility arbitration and ad hoc arbitration under United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules are not as expeditious for the receipt 
of the recognition and enforcements of judgment for arbitrated claims compared with the 
arbitration available to parties adhering to the ICSID convention,89 they certainly qualify in large 
part as mechanisms of dominant ISDS paradigm—and ones divergent from the spirit of Article 
422.  
Note that this above analysis stops short of considering the additional exposure brought about by 
legal mechanisms that seek to limit the ability of states to peremptorily revoke the protection 
offered by investment treaties. These “survival clause” mechanisms, built into most, if not all of 
Ecuador’s BITs,90 extend possible ICSID arbitration for investors after the state has revoked the 
treaty—thus increasing Ecuador’s potential subjection to ICSID jurisdiction.91 By virtue of the 
existence of these provisions, the substantive and procedural guarantees of the respective BITs 
continues to be effective for a further period of ten to fifteen years from the date of termination 
                                                                 
Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T ST . (2013), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204634.htm, and 2014 
Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T ST . (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227868.htm. Even in the 2015 Report—the latest Investment Climate 
Report available to date—the putative “renegotiation” of the US-Ecuador BIT was declared non-existent, and the 
status quo of the above maintained. See U.S. DEP’T ST ., supra note 76. 
88 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, supra note 95 (emphasis added).  
89 See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 81–90. 
90 See NOWROT , supra note 48, at 26–27. As Nowrot explains, the primary reason for the “frequent incorpora tion of 
these ‘survival clauses’ lies in the specific character of the kind of economic transactions addressed by international 
investment agreements. As for an example emphasized by Christoph Schreuer and Rudolf Dolzer, ‘[m]aking a 
foreign investment is different in nature from engaging in trade transactions. Whereas a trade deal typically consists 
in a one-time exchange of goods and money, the decision to invest in a foreign country initiates a long -term 
relationship between the investor and the host state.’ . . . [T]he validity of these provisions under current public 
international law appears to be beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
91 See generally James Harrison, The Life and Death of BITs: Legal Issues Concerning Survival Clauses and the 
Termination of Investment Treaties, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 928 (2012). 
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with regard to investments made prior,92 allowing respective foreign investors to launch  treaty 
claims during that period.  
 
C. Article 422’s ambiguity concerning putative treaty claims that arise from Ecuador’s 
investment treaty obligations 
 
In a manner different than described above, Article 422 also does not shield Ecuador from treaty 
claims from investment treaties that remain in existence post-2008.93 This category of exposure is 
separate from the category described in the previous section. Any aforementioned potential claims 
that Ecuador might face would be brought to an ICSID tribunal (or similar international forum) 
pursuant to the dispute settlement clause in force (or residually present) within the investment 
treaty.  
This next category of claims that this paper turns to now are a group of second-order claims. They 
stand as a category of treaty claims, brought forth by an investor who asks the tribunal to adjudge 
whether the host country, in this case Ecuador, breached the investment treaty when it did not 
provide the protections that it had promised in the treaty mechanism itself, be it either substantive 
(i.e. in the case of indirect expropriation94) or procedural (i.e. in the case of providing for ICSID 
tribunal arbitration). 
In this regard, Article 422(1) has interpretive certainties: it successfully precludes the state from 
including offers in future BITs to arbitrate in the supra-national sphere, while also preventing the 
state from becoming a future member of international organizations that require such arbitration. 95 
But, it still has judicially-uninterpreted ambiguities. These involve the unanswered questions 
hinted to in the above paragraph of whether Ecuador can be subject to the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals adjudicating treaty claims, regarding international conventions to which it once was a 
party. Traditionally, this category of treaty claims had been brought alongside (and in addition to) 
any contractual or commercial claims brought under the mechanism of the investment treaty.96 But 
                                                                 
92 See NOWROT , supra note 48, at 26–27. 
93 See, e.g., VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party 
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). See generally 
William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International 
Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251 (2006). 
94 See generally SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). These 
types of claims are now being brought creatively against countries, like Ecuador, that have since rescinded their 
ICSID signatory status. They are occurring commonly in the contexts of regulatory regimes (like tobacco 
regulations), or sovereign debt default. See David Herlihy et al., The Increasing Appeal and Novel Use of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, SKADDEN, Apr. 29, 2013, https://www.skadden.com/insights/increasing-appeal-and-novel-use-
bilateral-investment-treaties. 
95 See GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 6. 
96 See Gillman, supra note 33, at 295–96. For a background discussion of how investment treaty claims can impact 
or, in this instant case, give rise to jurisdiction on claims arising between host states and foreign investors, see 
MOSS, supra note 94, at 9–13, 81–138.   
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now, with Ecuador stepping away from the ICSID convention, Article 422(1) does not deal with 
putative investors who bring this category of treaty claims solely by itself. 
Thus, surviving BITs (with amended investor-state dispute settlement clauses), as well as BITs 
that Ecuador simply no longer wants to adhere to, provide the potential for claims of this sort 
brought by investors who wish to demonstrate that Ecuador violated the protections of the treaty 
itself.97 With Article 422 having an ambiguous stance with regards to treaty claims (as opposed to 
its distinct stance on their commercial or contract counterparts), ICSID jurisdiction still reaches 
into Ecuador. And, increasingly, ISDS tribunals of the dominant paradigm find against Ecuador 
for treaty claims. Take, for example, the recent arbitration on Ecuador’s 2009 windfall tax, a fiscal 
measure seeking to sharply reduce the profitability of foreign-owned oil operations within 
Ecuador. As recently as 2012 and 2014, ICSID tribunals found the tax to constitute as an 
expropriation under the wording of the France-Ecuador and US-Ecuador BITs.98 
 
D. Article 422’s allowance of arbitration clauses in trade agreements and investment 
contracts under the exception of 422(2) for “regional arbitration entities” 
 
The next subsection considers Article 422 more abstractly than those previous. Mainly, this 
subsection argues that the exception found within Article 422 swallows any forward progress the 
mechanism sought to make. In allowing an exception for “regional arbitration entities,” as 
provided in Article 422(2), the constitutional mechanism has simply relocated—more or less—the 
transnational situs for dominant-style ISDS, without effectively transforming the beast.   
The exception in Article 422(2) detracts from the spirit of the mechanism in a twofold manner. It 
does not inoculate the government from the external pressure of seeking foreign investment, which 
creates a particularly strong disincentive for Ecuador to renegotiate unconstitutional BITs from 
which it benefits. And, it does not inoculate the government from courting foreign investment by 
means of traditional assurances—specifically in this case, BIT clauses that stipulate internationa l 
arbitration as a means to settle investor-state disputes. This allows the Ecuadorian government to 
resort to instituting and creating, as evidenced by the push to do so,99 a regional investment dispute 
settlement body, the Union of South American Nations Arbitration Centre (UNASUR Center),100 
for which to submit future investor-state disputes. 
 
                                                                 
97 For a background on why governments break contracts that then may arise as treaty claims, see RACHEL L. 
WELLHAUSEN, THE SHIELD OF NATIONALITY: WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN FIRMS 15–
35 (2015). For background on the differences between contractual claims and treaty claims in international 
investment arbitration, see generally MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
44–54 (2008). 
98 See Julie Bédard et al., The ‘Law 42’ Arbitrations Against Ecuador and the Importance of BIT Language , 
SKADDEN, Jan. 2015, https://www.skadden.com/insights/law-42-arbitrations-against-ecuador-and-importance-bit-
language. For another case involving Law 42, see WELLHAUSEN, supra note 105, at 87. 
99 See Grant, supra note 10, at 25–35.  
100 See id. at 1–2.  
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This section labors to emphasize that the latter of the two scenarios described in the above 
paragraph is not consistent with the general spirit motivating Article 422. Regional arbitration, as 
embodied by the UNASUR Center, is particularly distinct from a proper “re-statification” of 
investor-state disputes. The political will of Ecuador behind enacting Article 422 was to disengage 
from the dominant ISDS paradigm. Doing this requires a thorough unyoking from internationa l 
investment dispute arbitration, as well as a proper redirection of the government to create a dispute 
body within the country’s territory, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of Ecuador.  
 
This territorial-extraterritorial distinction underlines the different calculus of rights that play out 
in both scenarios. A territorial, or “stratified,” or state-centric, investment dispute settlement body, 
necessarily has different public law considerations before it than does its international or, in this 
case, regional counterpart.  As Van Harten makes clear, the latter embodies a “privatization of the 
judicial function”101 in the form of transnational adjudication, which serves as a “method of control 
alongside domestic courts.”102 This contrasts directly with the former, which, in a theoretical sense, 
pursue domestic democratic norms that demand:  
 
i) that the State undertake, or refrain from, certain conduct within its domestic 
jurisdiction; (ii) that certain limits be imposed on previously unregulated State 
conduct within its jurisdiction; or (iii) that the State prohibit, regulate, or permit 
certain conduct by natural persons and legal entities within its jurisdiction.103 
The differences between each approach abound. In essence, the latter frequently promotes the 
interests of economic actors headquartered within capital-exporting states above and beyond the 
citizen interests of the host states, while the former might seek to re-calibrate those interests of 
foreign investors in accordance with interests of their own citizens. The project to “re-statify,” or 
domesticate, ISDS, then is a project of resistance,104 which seeks to “countervail the loss of 
democratic accountability at supranational levels.”105 
The best way to illustrate this point regarding Article 422(2)’s exception is by comparison to its 
regional cousin, Article 320 of Bolivia’s 2009 constitution,106 to which it stands in marked contrast. 
                                                                 
101 VAN HARTEN, supra note 75, at 177. International arbitration bodies serve not only alongside the (highest) 
domestic courts, but above those domestic bodies: the apex court’s rulings are often subject to review by the 
international arbitral body. See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Till Patrik Holterhus, The ‘Generalization’ of International 
Investment Law in Constitutional Perspective, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS, supra note 63, at 339, 346. In the case of 
the Ecuador-Chevron arbitration, the arbitration tribunal found that the Ecuadorian courts had breached Ecuador’s 
BIT obligations. See L Yves Fortier, Investor-State Tribunals and National Courts: A Harmony of Spheres? , in 
PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 13, at 292, 300–05.  
102 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 75, at 176 (emphasis added).  
103 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial Function of National 
Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT 'L & COMP. L. REV. 133, 138–39 (2011). 
104 See generally SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 37. 
105 Id. at 164. 
106 BOLIVIA CONST ., Art. 320 (2009), available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf. 
The relevant text is provided here: Article 320: Bolivian investment is prioritized over foreign investment: (i) 
Bolivian investment shall take priority over foreign investment. (ii) Every foreign investment shall submit to 
Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities, and no one may cite an exceptional situation, nor appeal to diplomatic 
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the anti-dominant ISDS paradigm, Article 320(2), explicitly rejects in its text international (read 
extraterritorial)107 arbitration forums. Channeled through Article 410’s definition of both “natural 
and legal” persons (ensuring that Article 320(2)’s “no one” extends also to business, corporations, 
and other strictly legal persons), Article 320(2) reaches where Ecuador’s Article 422 does not: it 
expressly requires that “every foreign investment shall submit to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and 
authorities,”108 whereas Article 422 allows an open door for crafty ponderings of what forum might 
sufficiently constitute a “regional [] entity”109 as to fit under the exception described in Article 
422(2). Bolivia’s mechanism, then, is surprisingly determinative: by closing off the possibility to 
any extraterritorial, non-Bolivian jurisdiction, Article 320(2) affirmatively relocates the situs for 
jurisdiction foreign investment within the boundaries of the Bolivian state.  
To be clear, this transforms the incentive structures. Bolivian politicians, faced with courting 
foreign investment by negotiating international investment treaties, are constitutionally prohibited 
from employing the favorite incentive:  the jurisdictional clause providing for internationa l 
investment arbitration. In a figurative sense, the constitutional mechanism has thus removed the 
bargaining chip of the dominant ISDS paradigm from Bolivia’s treaty negotiation toolkit. This was 
not the case for Ecuadorian politicians, who were left room by their mechanism to aptly maneuver 
the negotiating table and speak soft assurances in the ears of investors about how favorable 
“regional entities” might be to investor interests.  
As such, Article 320(2) serves as a heavy-hitting antithesis to the system of the dominant ISDS 
paradigm, whereas Article 422 was not. Article 320(2) places the burden squarely on Bolivia to 
re-imagine an ISDS paradigm within their own borders that can somewhat still attract foreign 
investment. Ecuador’s Article 422(2) allows Ecuadorian politicians to hide the ball from their 




Accordingly, Ecuador’s current situation is the result of the “gaps [of Article 422(1)] in 
comparison to the radical position of the . . . Constituent Assembly on [international investment 
treaty arbitration].”110 The country still finds itself subject to the jurisdictional domain of 
                                                                 
claims to obtain a more favorable treatment. (iii) The economic relations with foreign states or enterprises shall be 
carried out under conditions of independence, mutual respect and equity. More favorable conditions may not be 
granted to foreign States or enterprises than those established for Bolivians. (iv) The State acts independently in all 
of its decisions on internal economic policy, and shall not accept demands or conditions imposed on this policy by 
states, banks or Bolivian or foreign financial institutions, multilateral entities or transnational enterprises. Id. 
107 Primarily, in the sense discussed in Section 3. The Inability of Article 422 To “Re-Statify” ISDS, supra. 
108 BOLIVIA CONST ., Art. 320(2) (2009).  
109 See supra notes 107–08. 
110 GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 7; see also Gillman, supra note 33, at 291 (citing Vicente Peralta who stated that the 
position of the Correa government was to prohibit investor-state arbitration altogether, following the principles laid 
out in the Calvo Doctrine). 
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investment treaty arbitral tribunals, in direct contradiction to the motivating spirit behind the 
enactment of Article 422.        
At this point, doubt is properly cast not only on Article 422 as an instrument to properly “re-statify” 
ISDS, but also upon constitutional mechanism’s dominant narrative generally.  Put simply: Article 
422 cannot be viewed in a strict sense as a constitutional “pre-commitment” on the Ecuadorian 
government’s ability to engage with the economic forces of globalized trade, or its ability to 
entangle itself with future international trade obligations. As a factual, empirical, descriptive 
matter, Ecuador is still very much engaged with the international commercial and investment 
world.  
A substitute explanation, offered in the concluding paragraphs of this paper, considers Article 422 
instead as an environmentally- inclusive social contract—i.e. as a responsive legal mechanism of 
sorts (like any other, e.g. statutes or regulations) that aims to curb the deleterious effects of 
international investment projects upon Ecuador’s environment, its landscape, and its people. In 
this sense, Article 422 is not viewed as a full constitutional mechanism absolutely ensuring and 
securing territorial sanctity. Nor can it be viewed as a constitutional arrangement that can insulate 
the government from its international obligations. Nor can it truly inoculate the government from 
the external pressures of neoliberal economics.111   
Rather, it is seen as an article, like others in the 2008 Constitution which embrace the SK ideology. 
It strengthens self-governance capacity, but it does so in a way that a social mantra might. A social 
mantra that has reached the level of a governance instrument. In conclusion, while Article 422 a) 
aims formally to preserve Ecuador’s sovereignty concerns, and b) textually promises to disentangle 
itself from the interlocking web of international investment treaties, in effect it serves mostly as 
an optimistic, constitutional banner for the social Sumak Kawasy ideology and the Buen Vivir 
movement.   
 
                                                                 
111 The coup de grâce, if not already presented by Article 422’s institutional inability of Ecuador to dismantle the 
BIT framework that still subjects the country to ISDS, is the external economic pressures that Ecuador itself is 
unable to resist. The Ecuadorian government has indicated it may be open to negotiating international arbitration 
clauses within individual contracts, as provided for under the Production Code and the Planning and Public Finance 
Code—without qualifying in advance the particular ISDS mechanism to which it expects to consent. Similarly, the 
recent experience of extraction industries, heavily concentrated around a handful of certain investors, indicates the 
country’s possible incorrigible relationship with the international neoliberal economic system.  
